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feelings and experiences need to be taken into account.
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Treves et al. (2019) state that "multispecies justice must incorporate justice towards individual
non-humans…. We consider justice for these collectives precisely because they contain selves."
They add that what we owe these individuals depends on "their capabilities, needs and
relationships" and that factors such as "physical and/or psychological integrity, emotional and
cognitive functions, social affiliations with others, and ecological interrelationships" should be
taken into consideration.
This already addresses the question of "why … individuals [are] more important than
collectives." Gupta (2019) adds a focus on human motivations, although still from a humancentred perspective. Dawkins (2008), in considering the cognitive abilities and emotional
experiences of each individual within a species as well as their human-caused suffering,
advocates that we treat other animals justly. Like Treves et al., Dawkins urges that we try to
make our perception less utilitarian through compassion, and, perhaps more importantly,
through empathy (Bègue and Laine 2017; Baker 2019).
Cross-cultural studies have shown that the public see humans as superior to other
animals because they lack higher cognition and complex emotions (Haslam et al. 2008;
Chapman & Huffman 2018). Yet the scientific community has been showing this perception to
be false (e.g., Rogers and Kaplan 2005; Halford et al. 2010; Broom 2010, 2016; Shettleworth
2010). Alexander (2019) cites important neuroscientific evidence for consciousness as grounds
for protecting nonhuman species. This also applies to individuals. Evidence of higher cognition
and emotional experiences is abundant: Fish feel pain (Braithwaite 2010; Key 2016; Woodruff
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2017; Sneddon et al. 2018). Bees can be pessimistic (Bateson et al. 2011). All mammals have the
same basic emotional neuroanatomy (Panksepp and Watt 2011). Cognition and emotion are
crucial for animal welfare (Boissy et al. 2007) and must be used as basic arguments in favour of
an individual regardless of its membership in a collective. This in turn makes it clear that —
contrary to what Attfield (2019) suggests, illogically — not all living organisms should be
considered as equal in Treves et al.'s courts, otherwise we would have to include not only
plants, but bacteria, mushrooms or amoebas, which lack the biological structures for sentience.
Despite more similarities in cognition and emotion than differences, when human and
nonhuman individuals are in conflict, utilitarianism tends to dominate preservation actions
wherever the “trolley problem” is recruited to reach a decision (Bègue and Laine 2017). The
same is true when the question is about just preservation. In trolley problems involving humans
vs. nonhuman animals — such as children falling in zoo enclosures, or bushmeat in remote
villagers’ survival — the answer is invariably biased toward the human (who is deciding): the
children must be saved, the people must be fed. In a just and impartial court defending sentient
nonhuman individuals as equals, what would be the just action?
In human courts, specialised information is key to resolving disputes (Blandon-Gitlin et
al. 2011), hence expert testimony can make or break a case. In Treves et al.’s trustee model,
would the court always prioritise the interests of the collectives over their individuals? Would
there be a hierarchy, where in some cases the individual would be prioritized and in others the
collectives? The classical discipline of conservation biology only deals with the collective units,
completely ignoring the parts within (as I know from my initial training as an environmental
biologist, and as Bergstrom's comment (2019) illustrates perfectly). Even when deciding which
collectives to preserve, more or less artificial and arbitrary factors are applied to ascribe
conservation value (usually based on human perception of what nature should look like).
Management practices often involve brutal practices such as aerial shooting of wolf packs to
conserve caribous (Hervieux et al. 2014). Neither individuals nor their interests or experiences
are important. In the rare instances where individuals are considered, they are merely treated
as numbers or genetic profiles and only in relation to the whole unit (e.g., Witzenberger et al.
2011). However, ultimately, who or what benefits from the collective preservation?
Perhaps the discussion would be clearer if we asked why conservationists are interested
in conserving ecosystems, species, habitats, etc., collectively, without attending to the
individual? Or a more direct question: Who are conservationists trying to benefit when
conserving these collective entities? In another example given by Washington (2019) on feral
cats, we should ask: to whom are wild species more valuable than invasive ones? The concept of
invasive species in itself, while useful, is highly unethical, particularly as most species are
invasive because of human actions. A more ethical approach would be to consider the
perspective of the individuals involved, particularly highlighting their cognitive and emotional
experiences: invasive cats are creating suffering for wild local animals and that's why it is
important to address the issue, not because individuals belonging to local wildlife are more
important than individuals from an introduced species (because this really only holds from an
anthropocentric view).
Specific examples of how to apply the concepts and ideas being discussed in the target
article are thus urgently needed to address the issues raised in the many commentaries. We
need to ask the relevant questions if we want to achieve a framework for just preservation. For
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every policy and every action, we need to first ask: "Whom will this benefit?". And we need to
use comparative cognitive science to inform these decisions, which should consider the
individuals. Even though both the target article and the commentators had excellent points,
perhaps none of them was fully able to abandon an anthropocentric view and put themselves in
the other "selves’" shoes.
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